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Abstract 
Checklist Compliance is a term that has been used derisively in the information security community, implying that checklists 
are something used for paying lip service to security without instigating real changes to technology or processes. In this paper 
we argue that checklists can also be used as a practical tool to quickly establish a security baseline for water and wastewater 
systems. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the CCWI2013 Committee. 
1. Introduction 
"SMS fra VAV" stands for Secure and Monitored Service from Oslo VAV. This is a project that aims to improve 
the efficiency and the security in monitoring and control of the urban water and wastewater system of Oslo VAV 
in order to ensure a safe service to the public without compromising the environment, and while taking cost – 
efficient decisions for rehabilitation planning (Ugarelli et al. 2012). Oslo VAV has in the last years faced 
maloperation, accidents, or system failures with impacts to environment, service and loss of reputation. As a result, 
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Oslo VAV has a clear priority to invest in monitoring for controlling the system reliability, and in mechanisms for 
avoiding unwanted incidents, thus retaining the public's trust. 
However, while a monitored and controlled system can be more efficient and effective than a manual one, it can 
on the other hand be much more vulnerable. Integrated operational management in itself is not enough if security is 
not guaranteed. The ICT network has become a critical infrastructure within the critical infrastructure water itself. 
It is important that the IT security is evaluated with respect to the following three key aspects: confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. 
We have developed a guidance document on information security in water and wastewater network operation 
for the Norwegian water sector, inspired by Good Practice efforts in the Dutch drinking water sector (Luiijf 2008), 
and complemented with our own experience from process control networks in the Norwegian oil industry (Jaatun 
et al. 2009). Since technical personnel are not primarily qualified in information security, we quickly found that a 
simple checklist is much more likely to be used by the intended audience than a thick report. Many industry 
representatives opined that detailed step-by-step instructions for specific tasks such as firewall configuration would 
be even more useful, but this must be balanced by the realization that detailed instructions have a much shorter 
shelf life than general guidelines, since the former are frequently made obsolete by improvements in technology.     
In this paper we will describe initial experiences with our guide and checklist, and show how the checklist can 
be used both to gauge the current information posture of the water organization, and to establish a security baseline 
for water and wastewater control system networks (Jaatun et al. 2013). 
2. Background 
Fig. 1.  Illustration of the urban water cycle with corresponding communication system 
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Traditionally, industrial control systems such as found in the water and wastewater sector have consisted of closed 
networks with no outside communication. This is rapidly changing, and recent experiments show that the attackers 
are aware of these developments: A researcher at Trend Micro connected a cluster of industrial control systems 
honeypots to the internet, and found that they were under attack in less than a day (Simonite 2013). A honeypot 
(Jaatun et al. 2007) is a network server which looks like it provides a normal service to an outside observer, e.g., a 
web server, a file server, or in this case an industrial control system. In reality, a honeypot will simulate the 
function it is supposed to emulate, providing plausible responses to anyone who interacts with it, but not actually 
performing the requested actions. The honeypot owner, on the other hand, will be provided with a full complement 
of interaction logs to analyze the intentions of the attackers (since a honeypot has no legitimate uses, anybody who 
tries to use it is by definition an attacker).  A total of 39 attacks were registered during the experiment, and it is 
interesting to note that several of the attacks attempted to change water pressure or manipulate pumps. The fact 
that attackers could find the systems so quickly is not surprising, since there are dedicated search engines available 
to specifically locate industrial control systems connected to the internet (ICS-CERT 2011).  
Modern water networks involve many process control technologies (Fig. 1), and it is increasingly important to 
consider information security in the water domain. The classical information security incident in process control 
networks is indeed the Maroochy Shire incident (Slay and Miller 2007), where a disgruntled employee misused 
credentials to cause a sewage spill with major environmental impact. Current reports indicate that industrial control 
network professionals do not currently have faith is the security of their systems (LaMonica 2013). Since all 
processes now are automated, an attacker could inflict major damage both to water supply and sewage treatment.   
Many process control systems professionals were forced to reconsider their position that "information security 
breaches will not happen in our systems" when the Stuxnet malware was discovered in 2010 (Chien 2011). 
Allegedly developed by US and Israeli intelligence agencies, Stuxnet was specifically targeted at Iranian nuclear 
reactor centrifuges in order to delay the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons program. Stuxnet contained an 
unprecedented 4 different zero-day Windows exploits to be used against the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) 
which subsequently allowed it to make disastrous changes to the Programmable Logic Control units the HMI was 
controlling.  
A testament to the vulnerability of water networks is given by Dilanian (2011), who cites a penetration testing 
exercise at a major US water operator in 2011. Within a day, the hired consultant was able to completely penetrate 
the operator's process control networks, to the extent where he was in a position to modify the amount of chemical 
additives at the drinking water treatment plant. Remote access to the process control network by operator 
employees was identified as the weak point, putting the attacker in a position to make the water for millions of 
subscribers undrinkable.       
3. Checklist development 
The checklist has initially been based on several good practice documents as mentioned above, and in particular on 
Luiijf (2008). This initial list has then gone through several iterations with domain and/or security experts, 
converging on 45 questions to be treated as recommendations (i.e., answering "yes" is better than answering "no"). 
To get a more fine-grained result, we also added the possibility to answer "to some extent". Finally, we added a 
"not applicable" option, but stipulated that a justification has to be provided if this is selected.  
A snapshot of the checklist with result visualization is given in Fig. 2. The color scheme is intuitively selected, 
with green (yes), amber (to some extent), and red (no). The color blue has been selected for "not applicable". 
Water and wastewater network owners in Norway are predominantly municipalities, many of which are small and 
with limited resources. There is thus an important psychological element in the visualization of the result; heaping 
long wordy reports on the local finance committee's agenda is more likely to make the members' eyes glaze over, 
but a blood-red donut from a good-practice checklist may make them sit up and pay attention.    
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the checklist and quick results 
4. Discussion and Further Work 
As already mentioned, very detailed checklists have a short shelf life; Information and Communication 
Technologies change quickly, and step-by-step instructions for yesterday's solutions end up being more of a 
nuisance than a help. Thus, it is important that checklists are sponsored, and maintained on a regular basis, for 
instance by a relevant member organization.  
While it is obviously important to ensure that process control systems in the water and wastewater sector are as 
secure as possible, we must acknowledge that 100% security is unattainable in any practical system. This implies 
that security incidents will eventually happen in any system, and it is incumbent upon system owners to prepare for 
when this happens.  
There are several critical infrastructure sectors that share many similarities with the water and wastewater 
sector; from our personal experience we would like to highlight the oil and gas sector, and the electric power 
transmission and distribution sector. In a recent study performed by Line (2013), it is revealed that very few 
electricity Distribution Service Operators (DSOs) have formalized procedures for handling of ICT security 
incidents. Our discussions with water and wastewater sector representatives seem to indicate a similar situation in 
that industry, and we see this as an area for improvement. Furthermore, a sector-specific incident reporting scheme 
should be established; both in order for quicker dissemination of threats and specific attacks within the sector, but 
also to facilitate better learning from incidents (Jaatun et al. 2009). This is particularly important for smaller water 
network operators whose limited resources make it difficult to prioritize learning activities in isolation.   
Unfortunately, information security is a never-ending process, and since the threat picture is constantly 
evolving, continual improvement is the only choice for an organization wishing to maintain a good security 
posture. Bernsmed & Tøndel (2013) argue for the use of security indicators in order to stay one step ahead of the 
malfeasors. We believe that many of their experiences from the oil & gas industry can be applicable to the water 
sector.  
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a checklist for use when establishing a security baseline for water network operators. By 
balancing generality with detailed step-by-step-instructions, we find that this checklist can offer a tangible 
improvement in security of particularly smaller water network operators. 
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